If you need to know something about life, just ask Bill Bryson.
Bryson is probably best known as the multi-award winning author of the Short History of Nearly Everything – an admirably comprehensive summary of anthropology, physics and the history of science.
But before Bryson was accepting awards for this magnum opus, he wrote a stunning history of the English language – called Mother Tongue.
It is a fascinating read. It chronicles how, over the course of thousands of years, the new "world language" has been hijacked, influenced and manipulated by everything from Viking invaders to pedantic academics (for example, did you know that the rule against split infinitives is an attempt at incorporating the "purity" of Latin construction into English?).
Amongst other fascinating revelations, Bryson gives a learned account about the development of abusive language. Put simply, words that were once offensive are no longer thought to be so – and, conversely, words that were once given a seemingly tame meaning and had been interpreted as abusive.
The word "bitch" is a good example. If you uttered this word in 1867, you would be thought to be referring to a female dog. In 2005, however, the word can mean anything from a derogatory put-down of a female to the description of a particularly unpleasant role undertaken by an inmate in a prison.
So what about the use of abusive language in the workplace? Is it acceptable? And, if not, how does an employer decide (fairly) when language is abusive?
The recent case of Millar v Re/Max New Zealand Limited (Unreported, Employment Relations Authority, Auckland, 11 April 2005) provides some guidance.
Ms Millar was the National Accounts Administrator in the Re/Max "head office" – which provides support for Re/Max franchises around New Zealand. It appears that, amongst her various duties, Millar had some responsibility for the management of her office's IT resources. In December 2003, she was required to contact an IT engineer – Steven Rose – to perform some work on the office's internet and email configuration.
Rose came into the office, and was required to have a discussion with Millar – ostensibly to get some information about the IT systems. The two conversed for about half an hour. At some stage, however, the subject of the conversation turned. Rose said that Millar talked about a particular Re/Max franchise as follows:
It is unclear from the judgment as to the context in which these descriptions were offered so, for example, it is not easy to gauge whether these terms might have been used in jest (for example, mischievously to put down a good friend)
Unbeknown to Millar, Rose knew the franchise holder for the particular office. He was concerned that Millar had imparted this information (and had spoken about its employees in this way) and reported his concerns to the franchise holder. In turn, the franchise holder passed this information to Millar's boss.
Millar was called into her boss's office, and summarily dismissed.
Millar complained that her employer had not treated her in a procedurally fair manner (because she had not been given advance warning of the complaint against her, nor given any opportunity to take advice and respond). In reply, the employer said that any damage should be reduced by 100% because Millar had contributed to her downfall by behaving wholly inappropriately in the workplace.
The Employment Relations Authority reached a curious conclusion.
On the one hand, the Authority accepted that Millar had acted so inappropriately that the franchise holder could lose confidence in the quality and confidentiality of the service provided by Re/Max's head office. On this basis, the Authority concluded that Millar had committed serious misconduct.
On the other hand, however, the Authority took a dim view of the employer's failure to adhere to appropriate procedure.
It concluded that Millar should be compensated by payment of two months' pay and $7,000 compensation – but that these amounts would be reduced by 50% to take account of her contribution.
Was Millar's conduct so serious as to justify dismissal? Is calling a co-worker a "slut" a transgression which is so severe that it justifies the loss of one's job?
That is a question which, in isolation, is difficult to resolve. Are these terms now generally regarded as being derogatory to the point of being unquestionably offensive? Any listener to Snoop Dogg's latest album would regard them as comparatively tame.
Could they have been meant as a joke – or as a term of affection? Or was the response by the employer and the Authority an over-reaction? Is abusive language of this type a standard hazard of Kiwi life – hardly justifying the loss of a career?
Bill Bryson might have his own views about this. But, for the part played by the Employment Relations Authority, this conduct was sufficient to justify Millar's demise.